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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-Mere Silence as Constituting Crime of Obtaining Property
Under False Pretenses.-The defendant incorporated an automobile sales busi-
ness and to obtain the money to run it, gave as security, mortgages on auto-
mobiles, identified by motor and serial numbers, to the General Finance Cor-
poration. By the terms of the mortgage the defendant was not to sell or remove
the property without first securing a discharge of the mortgage on it. The auto-
mobile in the instant case appeared to be covered by such a chattel mortgage
which was duly recorded. The defendant without disclosing the fact of a chattel
mortgage of $570.20 sold a Dodge car to one Hamilton. The defendant failed to
secure a release of the chattel mortgage and the finance company replevied the
car from Hamilton. The defendant was charged with the crime of obtaining
money under false pretenses on the ground that he failed to disclose the presence
of the chattel mortgage. Defendant convicted.
On appeal, held, judgment reversed because of errors in the introduction of
evidence at the trial. But the court stated that false pretense can be the failure
to speak when it was necessary to do so, for one may make false pretenses by
act as well as by word. If the defendant sold the new car without revealing
the fact that it was mortgaged, he was deliberately acting a falsehood and this
is as objectionable as a spoken falsehood. People v. Etzler, 292 Mich. 489, 290
N.W. 879 (1940).
A review of the decisions reveals that there is a division of authority as to
whether the failure to speak or mere silence constitutes the crime of obtaining
property under false pretenses.
A number of decisions agree with the principal case. In a Georgia decision
the defendant in order to obtain credit, failed to answer certain questions in a
written statement as to loans and mortgages, thereby inducing the prosecuting
witness to part with his property. The court held that false representations may
be implied by way of concealment of part of the truth as to a fact or from
total and misleading silence. Ricks v. State, 8 Ga. App. 449, 69 S.E. 576 (1910).
In Jones v. State, 25 S.E. 319, 97 Ga. 430 (1895), where the vendor, though
aware of it, failed to disclose the fact that a $20 gold piece given for a pur-
chase under the impression that it was a dollar and gave change for only a
dollar, the court found that this silence came within the statute relating to
cheats. However, the charge of false pretense failed in another Georgia deci-
sion, where the defendant gave a mortgage on personal property without dis-
closing the existence of a prior first mortgage on the same property, for no
representation was made of the non-existence of the first mortgage. Griffith v.
State, 3 Ga. App. 476, 60 S.E. 277 (1908). In a California case where the de-
fendant, while borrowing money, failed to disclose fully his financial condition
the court stated, "the suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it
is a deceit, for a false pretense may be made by act, word, symbol, or token
calculated to deceive." People v. Mace, 71 Cal. A. Rep. 10, 234 P. 841 (1925).
During negotiations for the sale of lands defendants made certain representa-
tions, to the subsequent purchasers, as to the boundaries of their lands, but be-
fore its sale, found out that they did not own all they had represented but still
sold the land without disclosing their acquired knowledge, this concealment was
declared a deceitful means, but the decision was reversed for failure to charge
the jury on the point of the buyer's knowledge of the misrepresentation. Craw-
ford v. State, 117 Ga. 247, 43 S.E. 762 (1903). Also in a federal decision where
the legal tariff rate of coarse salt was 10 cents and that of coarse salt in sacks
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14 cents, and the defendant filed a shipping order describing merchandise shipped
as "coarse salt ... 10 cents" when the salt actually shipped was in sacks, it was
held, "a misrepresentation resulting in injury may consist of the concealment
of the truth" and if the defendants intentionally concealed the truth such con-
duct constituted a false representation. United States v. Sterling Salt Co., 200
Fed. 593 (W.D. N.Y. 1912). In the English case of Young v. The King, 3 T.R.
98, 100 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B. 1789), the defendants were found guilty of obtain-
ing property by false pretenses where they silently acquiesced in false statements
made in their presence by another defendant, inducing the complainant to part
with his money.
However, other decisions reach a different conclusion. In Colorado, in a
fact situation similar to the principal case, where the defendant sold a cow to
the prosecuting witness without disclosing the existence of a valid chattel mort-
gage on it, the court held that the mere non-disclosure of facts known to the
defendant, though the disclosure would have operated to deter the other from
parting with his money, was not a false pretense. Stumpf v. People, 51 Colo.
202, 117 Pac. 134 (1911). The identical result was reached where a defendant
sold six bales of cotton as his own, but on which there was outstanding a
chattel mortgage, and he withheld this knowledge from the buyer though he
made no express misrepresentation. McCorkle v. State, 170 Ark. 105, 278 S.W.
965 (1926). In Moulden v. State, 5 Lea 577, 73 Tenn. 577 (1880), the defendant
gave an order for wages due him and later collected them himself without dis-
closing the fact of the prior order, but it was held that this did not constitute
the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses. Likewise where the de-
fendant continued to receive payments for stock purchased on margin for the
prosecuting witness, acknowledging the receipt of the same, after he had sold
the stock, the court held this was not the crime of obtaining money under false
pretenses. People v. Baker, 96 N.Y. 340 (1884). A defendant, in People v.
Johnson, 87 Misc. 89, 150 N.Y. Supp. 331 (1914), was paid, on the report of
a bureau of the state, for work supposedly done according to certain specifica-
tions but which was in fact defective though he failed to reveal this when paid,
the court held him not guilty for there was no proof that he made any represen-
tations to secure the payments. But the New York court, in another case where
the defendant was charged with obtaining a signature to a warrant by false pre-
tenses, stated that it was not necessary that words be spoken or written but
that a false representation may be made by a mute or silent act. People ex rel.
Phelps v. Court of Oyer and Terminer of City of N. Y., 83 N.Y. 436 (1881).
Where the seller gave the defendant credit upon the faith of the latter's owner-
ship of a grocery and bakery business and gave additional credit after the de-
fendant conveyed his interest in that business, without knowing of the con-
veyance, the defendant was held not guilty of false pretenses for withholding
the knowledge that would have corrected the seller's mistaken belief. Blum v.
State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 578, 54 Am. Rep. 530 (1886).
In Wisconsin the Supreme Court apparently has not declared whether a
mere failure to speak or silence will constitute the crime of false pretense,
though it has held that acts or conduct as well as spoken words may constitute
a false pretense. Stecher v. State, 168 Wis. 183, 169 N.W. 287 (1918).
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